Can HCs Invoke Article 226/227 Constitution To Provide Reliefs Declined By Courts Below Citing Lack Of Statutory Authority?

NIRMALKUMAR MOHANDOSS

In the Constitutional scheme of things, the High Courts in India are vested with extraordinary jurisdiction not vested even in the Supreme Court of India. While discussing the powers of the Supreme Court vis-à-vis the High Courts, the Apex Court pointed out in Tirupati Balaji Developers (P) Ltd & Ors., Vs State of Bihar & Ors., [(2004) 5 SCC 1] that:

“Under the constitutional scheme as framed for the judiciary, the Supreme Court and the High Courts, both are Courts of record. The High Court is not a court subordinate to the Supreme Court … The High Court exercises power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution over all subordinate Courts and tribunals; the Supreme Court has not been conferred with any power of superintendence. If the Supreme Court and the High Courts both were thought of as brothers, the High Court has larger jurisdiction but the Supreme Court still remains the elder brother.”       

While citing Tirupati Balaji Developers (P) Ltd, in the High Court bar Association, Allahabad Vs State of U.P & Ors., [2024 INSC 15], the Supreme Court even held that Supreme Court should desist from directing the High Courts to dispose of matters within prescribed time limits. The logic as pointed out by the Court is simple i.e., the High Court is not judicially subordinate to the Supreme Court and that a High Court is constitutionally independent of the Supreme Court of India.

In this context, can High Courts invoke Articles 226/227 of the Constitution without any limitations (though sparingly) in situations that they deem it fit? More specifically, can High Courts invoke the provisions to provide relief when the same is declined by Courts/Tribunals below citing lack of statutory authority? The answer appears to be in the negative despite possessing extraordinary powers under the Constitution.

Recently in Saravana Hospital Vs the Deputy Director, ESI Corporation [CDJ 2026 MHC 874], the Employer covered under the ESI Act, 1948 had approached the Employees Insurance (EI) Court beyond the period of limitation (3 years) prescribed under the Act challenging the assessment order passed by the ESI Corporation. While hearing the interim application filed by the Employer under Section 5 of the limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of delay, the EI Court declined relief stating that it did not possess the power to condone the delay beyond the statutory limitation period prescribed under the Act. Aggrieved, the employer approached the hon’ble Madras High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. After hearing the rival submissions, the High Court declined the relief sought and observed that:

“It is evident from the fair order passed by the Tribunal itself that the legal position has since been settled, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is not applicable to proceedings before the ESI Court. In that view of the matter, once the statutory limitation period of three years has expired, the ESI Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain an application for condonation of delay. Therefore, the original order passed under Section 45A of the ESI Act has attained finality, and the prayer made in the present Civil Revision Petition cannot be countenanced.”

The Madras High Court had earlier held in The Deputy Director, ESI Corporation Vs M/s Prime Tex [CMA No. 1874/2021] that in the absence of an express provision vesting the Employees Insurance Court of power to condone the delay in commencement of proceedings before it, the Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain petitions to condone the delay. The Court also pointed out the legislative intent by comparing the provision relating to commencement of proceedings before the EI Court wherein the power to condone delay was conspicuously absent, with the provision relating to appeal before the High Court which specifically vested the High Court with power to condone the delay beyond the period of sixty days prescribed.

In the aforesaid circumstances, it can be reasonably inferred that since the EI Court lacked jurisdiction to condone the delay in commencement of proceedings before it, the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot interfere and in effect condone such a delay.

Similarly, in M/s Ansar Stores Vs The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner (C & R) & Ors., [W.P. No. 37911 of 2024], the Madras High Court had reiterated that a writ Court cannot extend the period of statutory limitation prescribed for Tribunals to entertain appeals and further that when a statutory appeal is barred by limitation, writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to challenge orders that are so barred. The Court cited the Supreme Court’s judgment in CCT Vs Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Healthcare Limited [(2020) 19 SCC 681]. 

Therefore, when the Courts/Tribunals below refuse to grant any reliefs citing lack of statutory authority, the High Courts cannot invoke their extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to grant the relief so declined.

NIRMALKUMAR MOHANDOSS